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I. Introduction
by Sara D. Jay and Patricia J. Aletky
Twenty years ago, issues involving
psychological testing rarely arose in
the context of labor-management
relations. Typically,management and
the union jointly referred an employee
to an assistance program where
patterns of absence indicated depen-
dency on alcohol or drugs, not because
of suspicions of psychological prob-
lems. Today, psychological problems
are more common in labor arbitration
and employment law cases.  Psycho-
logical issues arise in relation to
allegations of lack of fitness for duty for
psychological reasons or as potential
defenses against other allegations.
The goal of this article is to acquaint
readers with the issues which may
arise post-hire, particularly in the
context of grievance arbitration.  Post-
hiring disputes usually are the
disputes which come before arbitra-
tors, and are subject to the parties’
collective bargaining agreements and
grievance procedures.  This article is
based in part on a panel presentation
at the 2006 Fall Education Conference
of the National Academy of Arbitra-
tors, designed to better equip arbitra-
tors to deal with the growing need to
understand, analyze and evaluate
evidence presented by psychological
experts.
Psychological Evaluation in Labor Arbitration
Post-hiring psychological issues
arise most often  in three contexts
involving questions about an
employee’s continued fitness for duty.
First, an employee may be ordered by
management to submit to psychologi-
cal evaluation. The order for evalua-
tion itself may be grieved, even if the
employee agrees to the psychological
evaluation in order to avoid disci-
pline.1  Second, if the employee refuses
to submit, management may take
disciplinary action based on the
refusal, characterizing it as “insubor-
dination,” refusal of a direct order.
Third, an employee may be removed
from a position, or may not be returned
to a position, based on lack of fitness
for duty. Refusal to return an
employee to work for medical reasons
is generally not considered a disciplin-
ary action subject to just cause
requirements.2  However, whether the
employer’s decision was reasonable
will likely be subject to arbitration,
unless the collective bargaining
agreement explicitly provides other-
wise.  More rarely, a union or grievant
will raise psychological issues in
defending against discipline based on
psychological stress or disability.
II. Referrals for Psychologi-
cal Evaluations
In Minnesota, the courts have decided
that the order to submit to fitness-for-
duty testing is subject to arbitration
under the collective bargaining
agreement, because it affects funda-
mental working conditions, as well as
being “unusually intrusive.”3  While
the Minnesota court did not discuss
the matter in terms of the classic “obey
now-grieve later” principle,4 from its
language, the court appears to have
felt that the intrusion into an
employee’s privacy justified the
refusal, which would otherwise be
considered insubordinate.  The case
establishing that principle was sent
back to arbitration before Arbitrator
Christine Ver Ploeg. The conduct
which prompted the order for
evaluation resulted from a male
officer’s involvement with three
juvenile male offenders.  He had been
doing them favors which the officer
later agreed raised red flags about
possible abuse.  During the hearing, a
settlement was reached returning the
officer to work.
A collective bargaining agreement
may establish a right to resist
psychological testing.  For example, in
an Illinois case, the collective
bargaining agreement permitted the
employer to require psychological
testing, but only if it had just cause to
question the officer’s fitness. The
contract  provided, “The City may, at
no cost to the employee, to establish
the employee's fitness for duty, cause
any employee to submit to a physical
examination or psychological exami-
nation, from qualified personnel when
the City has just cause to believe the
employee is not fit for duty. When an
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employee is asked to be tested, he/she
shall be provided with the City's
reasons for referring the employee for
testing.”5  In that case, the arbitrator
found no just cause for the referral,
and sustained the grievance.6
While some collective bargaining
agreements may create a right to
challenge an order for psychological
testing, other contract language may
do just the opposite.Collective bargain-
ing agreements can establish not only
the employer’s right to require
psychological testing, but also that the
price of refusal is discharge.7  Such
language may preclude challenges to
the reasonableness in requiring a test
or evaluation. In some instances,
employers may predicate their right to
require fitness for duty evaluations
upon the general management rights
clause, granting management all
rights not otherwise abridged by the
collective bargaining agreement.
Nonetheless, most discretionary acts
on the part of an employer are subject
to the expectation that the employer
not exercise its rights in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.8
Fitness for duty questions often
arise in conjunction with disciplinary
decisions. Some cases involve disci-
pline of an employee for insubordina-
tion in refusing psychological evalua-
tion.9 Questions of fitness often arise
based on behavior, which may itself be
a reason for discipline.10 These
questions can arise in any profession,
but most often are raised in cases
involving police and others for whom
mental instability poses a particular
hazard to coworkers or the public.
In many states, law enforcement
officers are tested for psychological
fitness as new hires or prior to hiring.
Such testing seeks to avoid hiring
officers who are likely to overuse force
or to abuse their power on or off the job,
causing embarrassment and expense
to their departments. On a more
positive note, pre-hire tests may also
help in finding candidates who are
good at community interaction, or who
are good leaders who also respect the
command structure.
If an officer’s conduct after hire
raises questions about continuing
fitness for duty, a police chief may
order the officer to undergo new
fitness-for-duty tests.  Several Minne-
sota cases have involved precisely that
situation, including the case which
established that orders to be evaluated
are subject to the contractual
grievance procedure.11
One Minnesota case involved an
ongoing conflict between a lieutenant
and a sergeant that had resulted in
some name-calling in front of the chief
of police and continuing conflict in a
small department, with sides being
taken by all. Expert psychological
testimony established that there was
no realistic question about the
grievant’s fitness for duty; rather,
personality clashes had contributed
significantly to the tension within the
department.  The psychological expert
had been retained by the union as part
of its defense. The grievance challeng-
ing the order for fitness for duty
evaluation was sustained.12
Another case involved a county
deputy who made suicidal threats
while off-duty.  The deputy and her
husband, a peace officer for a different
jurisdiction, had both had extra-
marital affairs. The deputy had
arguments with him, twice getting a
weapon and making suicidal
statements. The woman involved with
the husband reported the incidents to
another county deputy, who reported
the incidents to the county sheriff.
The deputy was voluntarily hospital-
ized and submitted to a fitness for duty
examination. The examiner’s report
set forth seven therapeutic outcomes
for her to fulfill to return to work. After
the deputy achieved all seven, her
chief ordered that more fitness testing
take place. The union protested the
order for more fitness for duty testing,
as well as other issues.  The arbitrator
agreed that the order for further
fitness for duty testing was not
justified.13
A more recent Minnesota case
involved an officer who was unable to
recall firing his weapon after being
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dragged for a long distance by a
suspect’s vehicle and managing to free
himself.14  The police chief questioned
his mental status because he could not
recall firing his weapon while being
dragged, although there was a bullet
hole in a passenger window.  Again,
the arbitrator declined to order fitness-
for-duty tests.  In that case, and in one
additional Minnesota case,15 no psy-
chological evidence was presented.  In
the other cases described above, expert
psychologists were called to testify
about whether there was a need for the
fitness for duty testing.
In all of these cases, the arbitrators
examined the psychological evidence,
expert or otherwise, as an important
part of the decision, if not the decisive
factor. Psychological testimony is
increasingly a factor in law enforce-
ment cases, requiring arbitrators and
advocates to become more familiar
with its terminology and means of
evaluating expert testimony.
Questions about fitness for duty also
arise in fields outside law enforce-
ment.  In a number of cases, concerns
about fitness have been voiced because
the employee involved was using
heavy machinery or working with
hazardous chemicals. Security
guards,16 nuclear power plant techni-
cians,17 chemical plant employees, and
health care workers have all had their
fitness for duty questioned by their
employers. Even an employee in a
grocery store has had a psychological
evaluation at the center of removal
from his position.18 Concerns have
ranged from diagnosed depression and
paranoid schizophrenia to neuropsy-
chological problems including early
onset memory loss and Asperger’s
syndrome.  Some employers have been
able to demonstrate through psycho-
logical evidence than an employee
should not be returned to work,
particularly where the employee was
unwilling to comply with recom-
mended treatment.19
III. Psychological Issues as a
Defense
Psychological issues have been raised
by unions as a defense to mitigate
discipline.  One employee submitted a
psychological evaluation confirming
that he had “bashful kidneys,” and was
unable, rather than unwilling, to
produce a sample for a random drug
test. The arbitrator credited the
evaluation, reinstating the employee
with full back pay.20 In a case
involving use of force in the form of a
taser by an officer, a psychological
evaluation was considered in convert-
ing a discharge to a disciplinary
suspension.21
A framework for examining the
psychological evidence given in those
cases is emerging, similar to the
framework for examining such reports
in other contexts. The framework
tends to focus on three major factors:
(1) the content of the tests and
evaluations; (2) the qualifications of
the expert; and (3) the administration
of the test or evaluation.  These aspects
are examined below, along with some
suggestions for finding an expert.
IV. Psychological Testing
Psychological tests, sometimes over-
rated, are simply tools. A properly
trained psychologist is expected to
select the appropriate “tools” or test
instruments and use them properly.
Psychological tests are used as part of
an evaluation or assessment. In turn,
the assessment occurs in a context,
often with specific questions to be
addressed. It is the context which will
inform the selection of test instru-
ments. Thus, a referral question
regarding personality tendencies,
mood issues, addiction issues, danger-
ousness, or specific areas such as
memory function and various apti-
tudes will lead the evaluator to
different tests. In general, the use of
symptom or problem checklists is ill
advised in an independent exam; this
is because checklists are more
appropriate in treatment settings in
which the patient is seeking help for a
particular problem, and are associated
with symptom suggestion. A good
example is a Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) symptom checklist
derived from the Diagnostic &
Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders, 4th Edition (DSM IV)22 criteria
for the disorder. Use of such
instruments can impede the process of
differential diagnosis, discussed be-
low.
Some test instruments have broad
applicability and therefore have be-
come quite popular. The Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2
(MMPI 2)23 is one of the most widely
used test instruments in the world.
Educational seminars and written
works about this test undoubtedly add
to its popularity. The MMPI-2 mea-
sures personality traits for purposes of
treatment and diagnosis, as well as
being used to measure traits of
individuals in high risk, high pressure
positions involving public safety, such
as law enforcement and correctional
officers. The MMPI-2 is a checklist
filled out by the subject, and has a
large data base used to verify
interpretation. It is an objective test
with straightforward scoring and
relatively standard interpretation.
The MMPI 2, however, may not be
the best choice, depending on the
referral question and other factors.  It
is a self-report inventory which is
basically self-administered with su-
pervision, and the subject of the
evaluation must have a minimum
reading comprehension level. Fur-
ther, non-native speakers who may
read English quite well do not likely
respond to culturally laden items such
as idiomatic expressions in the same
way as native speakers.
The term “validity” often arises in
legal disputes about tests and
experts.24 Validity refers to the
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predictive power of a test, i.e., how
accurately it predicts the traits for
which it is testing. Validity is not a
dichotomous characteristic (valid or
invalid). Rather, it is a continuum.
There are many kinds of validity and
degrees of validity, so one must ask the
questions “valid for what (or whom)?”
or “how valid?” A test alone has no
inherent validity; it is the use of the
test data which renders the results
“valid.”
Tests are also described in terms of
their reliability, which may be
expressed with a statistical value.  As
with validity, there are different
degrees and different types of
reliability. Basically,  reliability means
the consistency of a measure; for
example, if a person  would score
similarly on the same or a similar IQ
test taken another time.
Test data as well as interview data
are viewed as a sample of an infinite
population of data about an individual.
One cannot know everything and
therefore the psychologist makes
decisions about sampling the data.
Quality may be more important than
quantity; that is, more is not always
better.  For example, administering an
aptitude test to someone who is
severely depressed or not appropri-
ately motivated to try to do well can
yield misleading results about ability
or brain function.  At best, it will add
no useful information and in that case
may be considered an unethical waste
of time and money. Further, the
typical test-taker will tire out at some
point and attention levels will
diminish.  Additionally, some tests are
subject to practice effects in which
items are recalled by the test-taker or
answers have been found.
Clinical interview data can be as
important as, or more important than,
psychological testing.  While there are
many different styles, a clinical
interview is not just a meeting of a
doctor and patient, or evaluator and
employee; a skilled interviewer asks
open ended questions, casts a wide net
for self-report data, and makes learned
observations about body language and
other non verbal cues.  Ideally, those
data are integrated with the appropri-
ate test results and any available
records.  It is the evaluator’s job to
integrate the data and fairly answer
the questions at hand as objectively as
possible, as well as offer information
about how the conclusions may be
limited (for example, due to missing
data, credibility of self report,
impossibility of perfect prediction,
etc.).  It is the evaluator rather than
the referral source who is ultimately
responsible for selection of tests and
interview questions.  Furthermore, for
a number of reasons, it is inappropri-
ate to commit to specific tests or
questions in advance.  The ethical
evaluator is expected to omit irrel-
evant personal data from a report
(although sometimes very personal
information is relevant). If a test offers
little or no “incremental validity”
(additional useful information), it
should not be used.
It has often been said that mental
health professionals tend to find
pathology in normal reactions. It is
therefore important for the consumer
of psychological assessment reports to
focus on specific abilities or concerns
related to the work environment.
There are countless people performing
their jobs well although they have
depression, obsessive compulsive dis-
order or more severe mental illnesses,
and one must remember that there are
people who are dangerous and/or
incompetent who have no psychiatric
disorder.  The concept of normal vs.
abnormal can be used statistically
(common vs. rare) or to denote a
healthy/harmful dimension.  A mental
health professional who uses the DSM-
IV is responsible to understand the
differential diagnosis process, ruling
out various diagnoses to explain the
symptoms presented, and ruling out
other, non psychological factors to
explain the symptoms (e.g., too much
caffeine can look like anxiety).  More
importantly, anyone using the DSM-
IV must understand that no diagnostic
categories have inherent reality; the
diagnoses are code words to facilitate
communication among clinicians about
conditions, based on consensual
agreement on the use of the terms.
Furthermore, the DSM is an evolving
work.  It began as an attempt to make
psychiatric disorders just like other
medical diagnoses, often ignoring
context.  Each revision has increas-
ingly recognized that what is “crazy”
in one context or culture may be totally
appropriate in another.  The most well-
known example of this evolution was
the decision, some years ago, that
“homosexuality” was not an illness.
Unlike some other areas of medicine,
in mental health there is a mix of
words with both technical meanings
and popular meanings, and sometimes
legal meanings as well, such as
“compulsive,” “depressed” or “dis-
tress.”
At times, psychological evaluation
results may raise additional questions
which can only be answered by more
specialized tests.  Neuropsychological
tests attempt to measure deficits in
cognitive functioning (the ability to
think, speak, reason, etc.) that may
result from some sort of brain damage,
such as a stroke or a brain injury.
Neuropsychological testing may be
recommended by a psychologist or
psychiatrist when other tests indicate
an unusual pattern of cognitive
functioning which would not ordi-
narily result from emotional or
situational factors, or where the
pattern points to possible neurological
disease.25
Tests may become outdated.  In one
case, the test administered to an air
traffic controller was criticized for that
reason.26  However, since the results of
the test were later confirmed by an
EAP national case manager/counse-
lor, the arbitrator chose to rely on the
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test.27  The arbitrator in that case also
noted that evaluation of flight
controllers was specifically entrusted
by law to the regional flight surgeon,
who had also agreed with the initial
findings. Advocates may be better
advised to check that current versions
of tests and evaluations are being
used, rather than risk having the
results discarded as inaccurate or
outdated even if there are justifica-
tions for continuing to use an older
version.
There are times when a psychologi-
cal evaluation cannot demonstrate
what an employer would like. For
example, in one case, an employee was
ordered to submit to a fitness for duty
evaluation in order to determine
whether the employee was being
truthful.28   To date, no psychological
test has been developed which can
make that determination.  Lie detector
tests have been found unreliable; they
measure how comfortable a person is
with the statement the person has
made, rather than whether the
statement is true.
V. Qualifications of Experts
Increasingly, both sides in a case are
presenting competing testimony from
their own medical or psychological
experts.  Even in cases where there are
not competing experts, the parties
may emphasize different opinions of
the professionals involved. The opin-
ions of lay supervisors, even with
special training as to the “aberrant
behavior” of an employee, may be given
little weight.29 The importance of
different facets of qualifications will
vary, depending on the circumstances.
In general, experience, training, and
specialization are all considered, as is
the application of those qualities to the
facts at hand.
Normally, the first question in
qualifying an expert is how much
experience the person has.  Generally,
more years of experience may lead  to
better-informed opinions. However,
more recent training in certain
specialties may be preferable, particu-
larly where the field of knowledge is
changing rapidly. For example,
autism and related diagnoses have
increased sizeably in recent years.
Currently, there are subtler diagnoses
on the autism spectrum.  Asperger’s
Syndrome, a “high functioning”
diagnosis within the autism spec-
trum, in lay terms, includes symp-
toms such as being unable to
appropriately understand social cues
such as frowning or physical distanc-
ing.  In one case,30  a union discovered
that a grievant in his mid-forties had
previously-undiagnosed Asperger’s
Syndrome. The union had had the
grievant examined prior to hearing
due to his behavior, which had led to a
restraining order being issued against
him to protect a fellow employee.  The
grievant simply did not accept that the
coworker did not want to include him
as a friend in her personal life.  This
was not sexual harassment, but an
inability to understand the ordinary
boundaries of human interaction.
Autism-spectrum disorders might not
have been known to previous genera-
tions of occupational psychologists,
much less arise as a defense in a
discipline case.
The prominence of an expert will
play a role in the deference given to the
expert’s opinion.  An expert who trains
other professionals, or teaches and
lectures on the subject at issue in
academic institutions, will generally
be regarded as having more expertise
than others.  An expert who publishes
articles or books on a subject may have
difficulty recalling all of the content of
the books and articles, however, if
confronted with apparently inconsis-
tent statements in those books or
articles. Advocates may wish to
discuss this possibility with the expert
prior to a hearing.
Beyond years of experience, a
witness’s area of specialization may be
a relevant consideration. Occupational
psychology or occupational medicine is
ordinarily given more weight in an
employment case than any other
specialty, as it is presumed by some
arbitrators that the occupational
psychologist or physician has the
greatest knowledge of the require-
ments of a position. Even if a
psychologist, psychiatrist or neurolo-
gist has greater knowledge of an
employee’s physical condition, that
knowledge may not help an arbitrator
decide whether it is safe to return an
employee to work, in the conditions of
the particular facility.
Safety considerations and occupa-
tional expertise may have special
weight in law enforcement cases,
where psychologists who regularly
perform law enforcement fitness for
duty evaluations have knowledge and
expertise with respect to pressures and
expectations unique to the field.31    For
police officers, certain personal quali-
ties, such as higher-than-ordinary
assertiveness, can be necessary to
successfully performing the job. If an
expert is not aware of this, the expert
can be measuring fitness inappropri-
ately.  For that reason, arbitrators
may defer to the police psychologist as
serving essentially as a “company
doctor” for the police force.  The opinion
of a company doctor has been accepted
as governing in numerous cases.32
However, in other cases, the com-
pany doctor’s opinion may not be given
greater weight than a doctor with a
relevant specialty, or if the company
doctor did not personally examine the
grievant.   In one case, a munitions
plant’s  medical director refused to
return a grievant to the workplace
because he was under psychiatric
treatment.  The medical director was
concerned about the medications
which the grievant was taking, and
opined that any employee under
psychiatric care was not able to work
safely in the plant because it handled
explosives.  The arbitrator disagreed,
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pointing out that the doctor had not
performed his own exam, had no
psychiatric expertise, and had not
known of any particular job require-
ments that the grievant would be
unable to perform due to his condition
or medications.33    Another arbitrator
also declined to credit the company
doctor, noting that the company doctor
had not examined or interviewed the
grievant, and did not testify at the
hearing or provide a written opinion.34
The company doctor’s opinion may
also carry less weight than a treating
doctor’s, based on  familiarity with an
employee’s current condition and
needs.35    This is particularly pertinent
when the employee’s prognosis for
recovery is in issue.36
No matter what credentials an
expert has, if the testimony does not
make sense, it is not likely to carry
much weight. There are certain
situations in which even the most stoic
employee would be expected to be quite
upset, such as a divorce with infidelity
on both sides, or involving a
coworker.37  Anger does not necessar-
ily make an employee a threat in the
workplace or demonstrate psychologi-
cal impairment.  In certain situations,
depression or anger may be a normal
reaction.38
VI. Test Administration
Although not currently a frequent
issue in labor arbitration, test
administration is likely to arise more
often in this context, as it does in the
educational context.39  The advocate
should determine whether the expert
is educated and experienced in
administering the particular test or
battery of tests.  Likely questions are:
How many times has the person
administered the test?  Did the person
have the recommended training on the
test?  How recent is the training or
experience? Was the test administered
according to the publisher’s protocol?
If not, what were the changes and why
were they made?  This may present a
problem in terms of subjective bias.
There is a possibility that the test
administrator was helping or harming
the grievant, even if unintentionally,
through the way the test administra-
tion was changed.
Another issue with regard to test
administration is whether cultural
differences and language barriers
have been taken into account.  If this
was done by translating or by reading,
there is an opportunity for inadvertent
bias.
Involvement of the expert with the
grievant, in some cases, may be
important. A frequent question by
advocates is whether the expert
conducted the interview or adminis-
tered the test personally, or was
limited to reviewing records. A witness
who is generalizing from a review of
records without having met the
grievant risks being portrayed as
having been unduly influenced by
subjective statements from manage-
ment,40   or lacking in knowledge of the
grievant’s condition.41 However, where
records are comprehensive and accu-
rate, a records review may be
sufficient to be credited in an
arbitrator’s decision.42
VII. Finding an Expert
Finding and utilizing a psychological
expert can be challenging.  State
licensing boards or psychological
association are good starting points.
Licensing boards exist to protect
consumers but many consumers do
not realize that (1) there is no law
limiting certain activities exclusively
to psychologists;43 and (2) psycholo-
gists have generic licensing, not by
specialty.  At the national level, the
specializations of clinical, counseling,
school, and industrial/organizational
psychology have been recognized, but
in practice the lines are quite blurred.
Many people who practice clinically do
not have degrees in clinical psychol-
ogy, and there are differences among
the states. Psychology’s national
guidelines are “aspirational” rather
than mandatory.44 Ultimately, one
might say that it is an honor system as
psychologists declare their areas of
competency and competency is in fact
quite difficult to measure in this field.
Some general guidelines in selecting
an expert may be offered:
•A Ph.D. is the highest academic
degree a psychologist will have; the
Ph.D. has to produce a work of
original research and in general
has a broader graduate education
than a Psy.D.
•Look for a degree in Psychology
(name of graduate department; for
example, a degree in educational
psychology is likely from an
education rather than a psychol-
ogy department) and graduate
major of clinical if the focus is
psychopathology; if the focus is
more vocational or rehabilitation,
a counseling psychologist may be
more appropriate. “Forensic psy-
chologist” is not a licensed title, to
the authors’ knowledge, and use of
that title may indicate a variety of
factors about the professional.
Resumes can be misleading;it is
best to ask these questions
specifically.
•Check with the state board of
psychology, which may have a
referral service to help find a psy-
chologist expert. State boards have
information regarding any nega-
tive findings about a specific
licensee and typically the person’s
credentials and areas of work are
open to the public. A state psycho-
logical association may offer
similar services.  There are many
voluntary and “vanity” board and
certification organizations of vary-
ing quality and meaning.  Trust a
state board to do the work of
checking credentials and making
sense of them as that is the board’s
job.
•Ask for a sample report (identify-
ing information removed, of course)
and meet with the person; the oral
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and written communication skills
will be apparent.  Specifically, look
for common sense and logical
explanations and weed out those
who seem to make automatic
assumptions based on ignorance,
prejudice, or even good intentions
(e.g., “anyone who has been sexu-
ally harassed will have PTSD”).
Since all good theories are
potentially refutable, be very
suspicious of circular or tautologi-
cal explanations which are unfair
and misleading.
•Clarify with the potential evalua-
tor the reason for referral and let
the evaluator say what he or she
could  or could not answer and
why. Some questions cannot be
answered and good professionals
know their limits.
•While it is certainly important to
provide an evaluator with some
detail about the  workplace, his-
tory and situation, an expert who
specializes in one type of work site
or one type of psychopathology may
not be the best choice. A more
comprehensive assessment which
includes a specific focus offers the
chance to pick up information
which a highly specialized evalua-
tor may never consider. In general,
the interview data in an indepen-
dent exam will be limited to what
the examiner asks, since most
examinees are not highly moti-
vated to tell their life stories.
Quality of interview data will be
strongly influenced by the level of
rapport the interviewer can
achieve.
•In addition to understanding
various categories of psychopathol-
ogy, the evaluator must have a
good understanding of the treat-
ability of various conditions.
Diagnostic labels are more useful
to employers and others if they are
accompanied by treatment/
remediation or further assessment
recommendations and prognosis
for change.
•Although there are no guaran-
tees, an expert who works at least
some of the time as part of a team
(for example, in a hospital, clinic,
university, court) or lists activities
on the curriculum vitae which are
peer-reviewed has been held to a
higher standard than one who is in
independent practice.
•If the expert is expected to testify,
a meeting just prior to the hearing
will help inform the expert about
the status of the case, expectations
and procedural guidelines, and
give the advocate an opportunity to
clarify any misunderstanding.
Such a dialogue prior to hearing
can save much surprise and
embarrassment.  An experienced
clinician who is a novice in forensic
circles can be a very credible
witness and perhaps less subject to
crossing the line into legal
opinions.  Similarly, the advocate
is well-advised to defer to the
expert who is obligated to conduct
the exam and report the results in
a professional manner, including
selection, administration, scoring
and interpretation of psychological
tests.
•Ask for a reference in a similar
case or ask peers questions such
as, how was the person to work
with and did the person provide a
helpful service.
In summary, look for someone with
appropriate credentials who you feel
understands your needs and will be
responsible for designing an indepen-
dent examination appropriate to the
individual and the context and likely
to provide a usable outcome. The
expert should be able to explain in
simple terms why various tools were
used. Ideally, the psychological infor-
mation can be translated to inform an
advocate, a court or employer
regarding an individual’s current
conditions relevant to the job and
opinions regarding how if at all the
reported problems could be addressed.
VIII. Conclusion
This article presents a general
framework for reviewing questions
Notes
1. In such cases, the union and the em-
ployer may agree to have the results of
the evaluation withheld from the em-
ployer until an arbitrator decides whether
the order was justified.  A union may have
an evaluation done by its own expert, or
by an evaluator jointly selected by the
parties.
2. City of Chicago, 97 L.A. 20 (Goldstein,
1990)(psychological fitness for duty);
Agrico Chemical Co., 86 L.A. 799 (Eyraud,
1985)(involuntary placement on medical
leave of absence, removing from light
duty position); Florida Power Corp., 87
L.A. 1213 (Singer, 1988)(termination per-
missible, no possibility of return to work);
but see, Papercraft Corp., 85 L.A. 962
(Hales, 1985)(discharge of employees for
failure to provide medical evidence of abil-
ity to return to work treated under just
cause standard).
3. Hill v. City of Winona, 454 N.W. 2d
659, 663 (Minn. App. 1990).
4. Employees are expected to obey a di-
rect order from a supervisor, bringing a
grievance later, unless the order endan-
gers the employee’s safety and/or is ille-
gal, with a few other possible exceptions.
See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION
WORKS, 262-65 (Alan Myles Ruben ed., 6th
ed. 2003).
5. City of Monmouth, Illinois, 105 L.A.
724, 726 (Wolff, 1995).
6. Id. at 729-30.
7. See Port of Tacoma, 96 L.A. 361 (Latsch,
1991). That contract provided, “When
there is a question of the mental or physi-
cal competence of the employee to ad-
equately perform the job in question, or
where the personal security of the em-
ployee or other workers is in question,
the Employer has the right to insist upon
competent medical evaluation. Refusal of
the employee to submit to such evalua-
tion will result in his discharge.” Id. at
361. The arbitrator upheld the grievant’s
discharge, noting that the grievant had
not followed the obey now-grieve later
principle. Id. at 365.
8. See City of Chicago , 97 L.A. 20
(Goldstein 1990); Agrico Chemical Co.,
86 L.A. 799 (Eyraud 1985).
9. See, e.g., La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 119
L.A. 1675 (Allen, 2004)(finding just cause
involving psychological testing in
post-hire disputes: what issues arise
with an order to be evaluated or use of
the results; who did the testing, what
tests were used, and how were they
administered.  As the use of these tests
and knowledge about psychology in
industrial relations grows, the labor-
management community will need
increased knowledge of the field.  We
hope this article will assist in
responding to that need. ?
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for discharge where employee had made
“bizarre” statements and company medi-
cal director had “reasonable cause” to
make referral to psychological based on
concern that employee who worked with
dangerous chemicals might be delu-
sional); Port of Tacoma, 96 L.A. at 364-65
(upholding discharge where employee
refused order to submit to psychological
tests that contract gave employer right
to require).
10. This often arises in conjunction with
threats made by an employee. See, e.g.,
Anchorage Sch. Dist., 119 L.A. 1313 (Di
Falco, 2004).
11. Hill v. City of Winona, 454 N.W.2d
659 (Minn. App. 1990).
12. City of Mounds View, Minn. Bur. Me-
diation Servs. Case No. 98-PA-1842 (Jay,
1999).
13. Blue Earth County, Minn. Bur. Me-
diation Servs. Case No. 05-PA-563 (Miller,
2005).
14. Wright County, Minn. Bur. Mediation
Servs. Case No.  06-PA-175 (Lundberg,
2006).
15. City of Maplewood, 108 L.A. 572 (Daly,
1997)(finding no just cause for suspen-
sion for profanity with dispatcher and no
just cause for requiring psychological
evaluation for same conduct).
16. Port of Tacoma, 96 L.A. 361 (Latsch,
1991).
17. South Texas Nuclear Operating Co.,
121 L.A. 193 (Jennings, 2005).
18. Safeway Stores, 94 L.A. 851
(Staudohar, 1990).
19. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 119 LA 1313
(DiFalco, 2004).
20. Gem Industrial Contractors, 89 L.A.
1087 (Wolk, 1987); compare, Northwest
Aluminum Co., 117 L.A. 1231 (Skratek,
2002)(finding just cause for discharge
where “shy bladder” procedures were fol-
lowed, employee was previously able to
produce sample, and there was no proof
of dehydration).
21. City of Middletown, Ohio, 121 L.A.
588 (Colvin, 2005)(psychologist’s evalua-
tion indicated situation unique, arbitra-
tor concluded behavior unlikely to recur).
22.   AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAG-
NOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIS-
ORDERS (4th ed. 2005).
23. Copyright 1989, Regents of the Uni-
versity of Minnesota.
24. Daubert  v.  Merrell  Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) pro-
vides a number of factors for a court to
use in deciding whether to admit expert
testimony.  These factors include, among
others: “(1) whether the theory or tech-
nique can be (and has been) tested, (2)
whether the theory has been subjected
to peer review and publication, (3) the
known or potential rate of error, and (4)
whether the theory has been generally
accepted.” Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus.,
Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1996) (quot-
ing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594).
25. These potential diagnoses appear in
reports as needing further testing or con-
sideration, in order to “rule out” the diag-
nosis.  This does not mean that the diag-
nosis has been ruled out, in fact meaning
just the opposite, that it has not been ruled
out and bears further examination.
26.  See Federal Aviation Admin., 121 L.A.
1321, 1330 (Landau, 2005).
27. Id.
28. Wright County, Minn. Bur. Mediation
Servs. Case No.  06-PA-175 (Lundberg,
2006).
29. See, e.g., South Texas Nuclear Oper-
ating Co., 121 L.A. 193 (Jennings, 2005)
(supervisors assigned to monitor and re-
fer to EAP, referral found retaliatory and
unjustified, removal of evidence of refer-
ral ordered).
30. Not cited, parties at the hearing re-
quested no publication or references, with
consent of the arbitrator. The grievant
was not reinstated.
31. See, e.g., Blue Earth County, Minn.
Bur. Mediation Servs. Case No.  05-PA-
563 (Miller, 2005).
32. SafewayStores,94 L.A.851 (Staudohar,
1990); see also, Hughes Aircraft Co., 49 L.A.
535, 539 (Doyle, 1967)(dicta).
33. Hercules, Inc., 91 L.A. 521 (Nolan,
1988).
34. St. Clair County Road Commission,
120 L.A. 496, 499 (Kelman, 2004).
35. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 116 L.A.
1606 (Bell, 2002).  See, Lansing Commu-
nity College, 122 L.A. 1392 (McDonald,
2006)(holding discharge for making
threats was for just cause despite
grievant’s claim that she returned to work
prematurely where grievant’s personal
psychologist recommended that she was
ready to return to work).
36. See, e.g., City of Middletown, Ohio,
121 L.A. 588 (Colvin, 2005).
37. Ormet Corp., 118 L.A. 363 (Sergent
2002); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co.,116 L.A.
1606 (Bell, 2002); Blue Earth County,
Minn. Bur. Mediation Servs. Case No.  05-
PA-563 (Miller, 2005).
38. South Texas Nuclear Operating Co.,
121 L.A. 193 (Jennings, 2005) (employee
not a threat);  Akron Metropolitan
Housing Authority, 118 L.A. 824 (Coyne,
2003) (justifiable anger healthy and
normal).
39. See, Cincinnati Gas, 116 L.A. at 1613-
14.
40. Akron Metropolitan Housing Author-
ity,118 L.A. at 831-32 (discussing normal
range results of MMPI); Cincinnati Gas,
116 L.A. at 1614 (discussing at length
tests administered, results and expert
testimony, noting that the company-pro-
vided expert had relied on employer’s
description of accusations, which it
required expert not to discuss with griev-
ant; grievance was sustained).
41. St. Clair County Road Commission,
120 L.A. 496 (Kelman, 2004).
42. Federal Aviation Admin., 121 L.A.
1321 (Landau, 2005).
43. This means that one cannot assume
an individual is a licensed psychologist
just because the person has administered
tests or is engaging in counseling activi-
ties or therapy. For example, clergy
often counsel congregants, and licensed
social workers provide therapy.
44. The American Psychological Associa-
Recent
Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Em-
ployee Relations Report. It highlights
recent legal developments of interest
to the public employment relations
community. This issue focuses on
developments under the two  collec-
tive bargaining statutes and the equal
employment opportunity laws.
Developments
IELRA Developments
In Board of Education,Glenview Com-
munity  Consolidated School District
No. 34 v. IELRB, 374 Ill.App.3d 892
(4th Dist. 2007), the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Fourth District held that
that IELRB's decision that Glenview
School's technology administrative
assistant was not a "confidential
employee" excluded from collective
bargaining under the IELRA was not
clearly erroneous.
The court explained that a "confi-
dential employee," excluded from
organizing under the IELRA, is an
employee who, "in the regular course of
his or her duties, has access to
information relating to the effectua-
tion or review of the employer’s
collective bargaining policies." 115
ILCS 5/2(n)(ii). Further, the court
relied on the IELRB's decision in Lake
County Area Vocational System, 20
PERI   5 (IELRB 2004) which clarified
that, when deciding unit-clarification
petitions involving employees respon-
sible for the operation of an employer's
computer system, the Board will
examine: (1) whether evidence exists of
Confidential Employees
¶ 
tion, Washington, D.C. (www.apa.org) is
the source of practice guidelines in a large
number of areas. ?
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"actual access to confidential collective
bargaining information in the regular
course of duties;" (2) the job description
of the position at issue; and (3) the
employee's day-to-day activities.
The court held that the technology
administrative assistant did not have
"actual access" to confidential infor-
mation, because, although the assis-
tant could have had access to such
information, the school district did not
establish that the assistant actually
had more than incidental access and
authority to read documents pertain-
ing to labor relations. Second, "while
[the assistant's] job description states
that her position requires the 'ability
to handle confidential information,' it
does not elaborate as to the nature of
the confidential information." Finally,
the court explained,  the technology
administrative assistant's day-to-day
activities included mostly administra-
tive duties, and even the assistant's
technical duties "[do] not involve
authorized, unfettered access to
confidential collective-bargaining in-
formation."
IPLRA Developments
Duty to Bargain
In AFSCME, Council 31 v. State of
Illinois, Case No. S-CA-05-004 (ILRB
State Panel 2007), a majority of the
State Panel reversed the ALJ's
recommended order that AFSCME,
Council 31 failed to prove that the
State of Illinois violated Section 10(a)(4)
of the IPLRA. Under the collective
bargaining agreement between the
parties, the union waived its statutory
right to bargain over decisions to lay-
off employees but retained its right to
bargain over the effects of any such
layoff. On June 30, 2004, which was
the date the CBA expired, the parties
agreed that 68 employees in the unit
would be laid off and that 100
additional employees would be affected
by a planned layoff. However, the
Board found that in three meetings
where the parties were to discuss the
effects of these layoffs, the state's lay-
off plan was not settled. Thus, it was
difficult, if not impossible, for the
union to advance its proposals on the
effects of the layoffs.
The Board disagreed with the ALJ's
conclusion that the Union could in
essence negate the contractually-
based right of the state to layoff
employees if it were held that the state
could not implement the layoff until
the bargaining over effects reached
agreement or impasse. On the
contrary, the Board held that the
state's “relatively hurried implemen-
tation of the layoff ” should not deprive
the union of an adequate opportunity
to bargain over the effects of the
layoffs. It was the state's duty to
ensure that negotiations took place
over a planned period of time before the
layoffs were to occur. Here, the Board
found the state did not make the good
faith effort to allow the negotiations
over the effects to reach agreement or
impasse before it implemented the
layoffs. Therefore, the Board held the
conduct violated Sections 10(a)(4) and
(1) of the Act.
In Metropolitan Alliance of Police,
Lisle Police Chapter No. 87 and
Village of Lisle, Case No. S-CA-05-197
(ILRB State Panel 2007), the ILRB
affirmed the decision of the ALJ, who
concluded that the Village of Lisle did
not violate Section 10(a)(4) of the
IPLRA by unilaterally increasing
employees' contributions toward the
cost of family and dependent insur-
ance coverage.  The issue arose after
the Police Benevolent and Labor
Committee ("PBLC") disclaimed  in-
terest in continuing to serve as the
bargaining representative of the
village's employees in the rank of
patrol officer. Under the collective
bargaining agreement with the
PBLC, the village agreed to pay 100
percent of the premium for employee
insurance and 75 percent of the
premium for dependants.  However, as
a result of the decertification, the em-
ployees were unrepresented between
December 2, 2004, and February 2,
2005. During that time, the village
increased  the premiums for employees
with dependent health care coverage.
After the Metropolitan Alliance of
Police ("MAP") was certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative
on February 2, 2005, it argued that the
village violated the IPLRA by failing to
bargain the increase in health care
costs. The ALJ rejected MAP's
argument.  The ALJ determined that
at the time the increase was
instituted, the employees in the
bargaining unit were not represented.
The ALJ also found the increase in
premiums consistent with the provi-
sions of the PBLC collective bargain-
ing agreement.  Furthermore, the ALJ
rejected MAP's argument that past
practice prevented the village from
increasing costs.
Affirming the ALJ, the State Panel
determined that when a union ceases
to be a representative, any existing
contract ends as does the employer's
duty to bargain.  The Board noted that
while an employer has a duty to
maintain the status quo during an
organizing campaign, the village did
just that by maintaining the provi-
sions of the contract with the PBLC.
Likewise, the Board failed to find
evidence of a past practice that would
prevent the village from increasing
health costs.  Indeed, the increase was
wholly consistent with the village's
agreement with the PBLC and even if
a past practice did exist, it could not
supersede this agreement. Accord-
ingly, the Board affirmed the ALJ's
decision in full.
Majority Interest Petitions
In County of DuPage v. ILRB, 2007 Ill.
App. LEXIS 950 (2d Dist. 2007), the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Second
District held that the ILRB’s regula-
tions governing majority interest
petitions conflicted with the IPLRA
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and were invalid.  The court further
held that a majority interest petition
submitted by the Metropolitan Alli-
ance of Police did not support
certification and reversed the State
Panel’s order certifying MAP as
exclusive bargaining representative
for DuPage County sheriff deputies
other than those in the corrections
division.
Section 9(a-5) of the IPLRA provides,
“The Board shall designate an
exclusive representative for purposes
of collective bargaining when the
representative demonstrates a show-
ing of majority interest by employees
in the unit.  If the parties to a dispute
are without agreement on the means to
ascertain the choice, if any, of em-
ployee organization as their represen-
tative, the Board shall ascertain the
employees’ choice of representative on
the basis of dues deduction authoriza-
tion and other evidence, or if
necessary, by conducting an election.”
The court concluded that the words
“dues deduction authorization and
other evidence” were ambiguous.  They
could reasonably be interpreted as
providing that either dues deduction
authorizations or other evidence of
majority support would suffice and
could also reasonably be interpreted as
requiring both types of evidence to
support a majority interest opinion.
The ILRB’s rules allow a majority
interest petition to stand on the basis of
either type of evidence.
The court interpreted section 9(a-5)
to require that majority interest
petitions be supported by both dues
deduction authorizations and other
evidence of majority support. The court
reasoned that interpreting section 9(a-
5) in accordance with the ILRB’s rule
would render the specification of dues
deduction authorizations superfluous.
The court further contrasted section
9(a-5)’s specification of evidence to
support a majority interest petition
with section 9(a)’s provision that an
election petition be supported by a 30
percent showing of interest without
specifying any particular type of
evidence required.  Finally, the court
considered its interpretation consis-
tent with legislative history of section
9(a-5) which showed that the
legislature considered the evidence
supporting the majority interest
petition as equivalent to an election.
Consequently, the court held the
ILRB’s regulations invalid and
vacated the State Panel’s certification
of MAP which had been issued
pursuant to those regulations.
In Metropolitan Alliance of Police
Burr Ridge Command Chapter No.
13 and Village of Burr Ridge, Case
No. S-RC-05-109 (ILRB State Panel
2007), the ILRB State Panel affirmed,
with modification, an ALJ's order
certifying the Metropolitan Alliance of
Police as the exclusive bargaining
representative for Village of Burr
Ridge police officers in the ranks of
corporal and sergeant.  Burr Ridge
opposed the certification petition,
arguing that corporals and sergeants
were excluded under the IPLRA as
supervisors.  Burr Ridge also argued
that one of the corporals should be
excluded from coverage under the
Act's managerial exception, and that
the petitioned for bargaining unit was
inappropriately narrow under Section
9(b) of the Act.
The ALJ rejected Burr Ridge's
argument that the corporals were
supervisors. Instead, the ALJ deter-
mined that the corporals' work was
indistinguishable from that of subor-
dinates. However, the ALJ agreed
with Burr Ridge that sergeants were
supervisors within the meaning of
Section 3(r) of the Act because they
directed and adjusted grievances
with the requisite independent judg-
ment.
The State Panel concluded that
sergeants did not direct and adjust
grievances with the requisite amount
of independent judgment, but other-
wise affirmed the ALJ's findings.  The
Board noted that while sergeants had
authority to evaluate their subordi-
nates, the sergeants' evaluations were
separately reviewed by two depart-
ment heads before the evaluations
were returned to the sergeants for
presentation to the subordinates. In
addition, the police chief had authority
to modify the evaluations before they
were delivered to subordinates. Fi-
nally, although sergeants  were the
first step in the grievance procedure,
the Board found that they lacked the
authority to grant grievances. Accord-
ingly, the Board concluded that the
sergeants did not have the requisite
authority to be considered supervisors
under the IPLRA.
In International Union of Operat-
ing Engineers Local 150 v. Village of
Hazel Crest, Case No. S-RC-06-175
(ILRB State Panel 2007), the State
Panel agreed with the ALJ that the
Village of Hill Crest's  police sergeants
were public employees under the
IPLRA. The village claimed that the
sergeants were supervisors because
they disciplined their subordinates
with the requisite independent judg-
ment.
The village claimed the sergeants
had authority to counsel their
subordinates. Yet, the Board found
that the village kept no record of these
counselings and no evidence was
presented to show that these had any
effect on the wages, hours, or terms
and conditions of employment of those
counseled. The village also argued that
the sergeants issued verbal warnings
or reprimands to their subordinates.
However, the Board found that these
warnings and reprimands were only
issued when an employee was late or
absent without leave. Furthermore,
the sergeants lacked the independent
judgment to choose between verbal
reprimand or warning and other more
significant courses of action. Finally,
Supervisers
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the village contended that the
sergeants recommended that subordi-
nates receive written reprimands from
the police chief and deputy chief.
However, after the sergeants made
such recommendations, the chief and
deputy chief  independently reviewed
the matter, "undercutting the effec-
tiveness of the sergeant's recommen-
dation entirely."
The State Panel concluded that the
seargents lacked the requisite inde-
pendent judgment and were not
supervisors.
NOTE:
Due to the temporary closure for
renovations of the ILIR Library,
Further References will not appear in
this issue. It will return in the next
issue.
EEO Developments
Pay Discrimination
InLedbetter v.Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 127 US 2162 (2007), the
Supreme Court held that each discrete
salary decision made by an employer
triggers the running of the limitations
period for filing a charge under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  Lilly
Ledbetter worked for Goodyear for over
21 years. Upon retirement in 1998,
Ledbetter sued Goodyear for alleged
Title VII pay discrimination. Pay
raises at Goodyear throughout
Ledbetter's employment were based on
performance reviews. Ledbetter claim-
ed that she was given poor evaluations
because of her sex, and her pay did not
increase as it would have had she been
male, to the point where, upon her
retirement, she was underpaid rela-
tive to her male counterparts.
A jury found in Ledbetter's favor,
holding that Goodyear violated Title
VII. On appeal Goodyear claimed,
pursuant to the statute of limitations
set out in Title VII,  that Ledbetter was
barred from recovering for any acts
that occurred more than 180 days
prior to Ledbetter filling her EEOC
complaint, or all decisions before
September 26, 1997. Further, it
argued that no discriminatory act took
place during the 180-day period,
during which only two pay decisions
occurred. The Eleventh Circuit agreed
with Goodyear's argument.
The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari on appeal by Ledbetter. The only
issue was whether "a plaintiff may
bring an action under Title VII . . .
alleging illegal pay when the disparate
pay is received during the statutory
pay period, but is the result of
intentionally discriminatory pay deci-
sions that occur outside the limita-
tions period." Ledbetter, in essence,
claimed that Goodyear should be held
accountable for discriminatory perfor-
mance evaluation decisions made
prior to the 180-day filing period
because those decisions resulted in
disparate treatment (lower paychecks)
that took place during the 180-day
filing period. And that even if there
was no intentional discrimination
within the 180-day period, such intent
should be carried through based on
past acts (unfair performance evalua-
tions) that were done intentional-
ly. Goodyear disagreed, arguing that
each and every action is an act unto
itself that starts a 180-day filing period
when that act is committed.
The Court agreed with Goodyear. In
a 5-4 decision with the majority
opinion written by Justice Alito, the
Court held that past discriminatory
actions that led up to pay discrimina-
tion could not be carried forward.
According to the opinion, Ledbetter
should have filed with the EEOC
within 180 days after each discrimina-
tory act, each lower paycheck or each
unfair performance evaluation, took
place. Further, intent could not be
carried through from the performance
evaluations that were conducted
unfairly where the resulting lower
paycheck was given to her without
intent to discriminate. The intent to
discriminate would have to have been
attached to the applicable paychecks
within the 180 days.
Justice Ginsberg dissented, argu-
ing that pay discrimination that takes
place over time like this is very
different from singular, identifiable
acts. Pay discrimination is more
similar to hostile environment dis-
crimination than to a single act of
discrimination. That is to say, it is not
easy for an employee to identify when
he or she is being discriminated
against with respect to compensation
because there is often a gradual build-
up before the employee can identify the
discrimination. ?
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